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Abstract  
 
The article integrates theoretical perspectives from the resource-based view of the firm, 
dynamic capabilities and contingency. It explains one particular characteristic of the 
general business environment of the firm, regulatory uncertainty, and its influence on 
dynamic capabilities of a corporate political strategy (nonmarket strategy) and value 
creation. I argue that scanning and predictive capabilities as well as institutional influence 
capabilities will lead to a reduced perceived uncertainty by the firm. In consequence, firms 
that perceive a high regulatory uncertainty aim at developing these dynamic capabilities. 
Further, I argue that firms with stronger nonmarket capabilities will rather drive to pursue 
investments under perceived regulatory uncertainty than firms with weaker nonmarket 
capabilities.  
 
 
Keywords 
Regulatory uncertainty, dynamic capabilities, contingency, resource-based view, 
nonmarket strategies 
1.  Introduction 
The motivation of the paper is to shed light on the question of how regulatory uncertainty 
influences firms and eventually their investment behavior. A concrete example in today’s 
business can be found in the power sector where firms in liberalized EU market have to 
face new challenges. The liberalization of the EU electricity market introduced new 
challenges for firms, which made them behave differently. Power firms have to face 
uncertainties not only due to the unpredictability of market developments (like fuel prices), 
but also due to regulatory uncertainty that can, e.g., influence the market design, set new 
environmental constraints, approve or disapprove new technologies or set standards for 
energy efficiency. All uncertainties faced by a firm significantly influence investment 
decisions. However, on the contrary to market uncertainty, uncertainty in regulation can 
change abruptly, from one day to the other with huge business impact on the firm. A single 
new policy can thus turn the profitability of an investment from positive to negative or 
even prevents any value generation of the investment (due, for example, to the blockage of 
a technology). In sum, regulatory uncertainty do affect investment projects and may delay 
or deter the investment choices. As the underlying uncertainties cannot be changed or will 
only disappear over time, firms have to think about appropriate strategic responses tin 
order to cope with regulatory uncertainty. 
In general, the interaction between business and politics has become more complex and 
interwoven so that it would be simplified to only speak of strategies of firms that purely 
address their market environment. In particular in the specific case of regulatory 
uncertainty, firms have a clear motivation to address the relevant politicians or regulatory 
authorities in order to gain policies in their favor. The paper addresses the theory behind 
the younger perspectives of nonmarket strategies in literature and eventually advances 
existing theory by exploring how firms adapt their nonmarket capabilities when 
uncertainties arise from their nonmarket environment.  
The article first describes the difference between market and nonmarket strategies and 
outlines the different theories that explain why and how firms engage in their political 
environment. Subsequently, the heterogeneity of firms with the different nonmarket 
strategies and different performances will be explained by means of dynamic capabilities 
and contingency to its environment. Further, the concept of perceived regulatory 
uncertainty as one key variable of the firm’s external nonmarket environment will be 
explained. Propositions are made to characterize the relationship between the nonmarket 
capabilities and regulatory uncertainty. Finally, a discussion will be started about the 
impact of nonmarket capabilities on firms investments in a regulatory uncertain 
environment.  
2. Market and nonmarket components within strategy  
Strategic responses can be both based on market and nonmarket components to address the 
market and nonmarket environment of the firm. Market components address all 
interactions between the firm and other parties by markets or private agreements. Market 
strategies have been analyzed by a multitude of scholars with Porter (1980, 1985) in the 
forefront and should not further discussed at this point. Nonmarket components on the 
other hand address all interactions with the public, stakeholders, government, the media, 
and public institutions (Baron 1995). A market strategy is thus an aligned course of 
action in the market environment of the firm in order to create value expressed by an 
increase in its performance. A nonmarket strategy yields to create value by addressing 
parties in the nonmarket environment that leads in an indirect consequence to a higher 
performance of the firm. A typical example is the lobbying effort of a firm to its 
government to open up foreign markets hitherto closed for the firm. The lobbying is thus 
an expense of the firm in its accounting whereas the sales in the new market will lead to 
increased earnings. Nonmarket strategies are thus of particular importance for firms that 
have a regulated business or interact regulatory with the government or public agencies.  
In the strategy formulation process, both market and nonmarket components must be 
considered within an integrated strategy to ensure the most effective improvement of the 
overall performance of the firm.   
 
Nonmarket strategies have been a much younger subject of analysis among scholars, which 
first started with the analysis of lobbying or campaign financing and its relationship with 
business strategy (e.g., Shipper & Jennings, 1984; Yoffie, 1988; Weidenbaum, 1990; Grier 
et. al. 1994). As the interrelation between governments and business increased, more 
scholars engaged in this field and analyzed the broader connection of corporate strategy 
and firms’ ability to influence a range of actors in the public (Oliver & Holzinger, 2008). 
Both the government’s influence on firm activities and outcomes has increased (Lenway & 
Rehbein, 1991) as well as the influence of businesses on public-policy making (Blau & 
Harris, 1992; Keim & Baysinger, 1988). Besides lobbying and campaign financing, 
scholars analyzed a set of control actions including advocacy advertising, constituency 
building and coalition formation (e.g., Bonardi et al., 2005, Hillmann & Hitt, 1999, 
Hillmann et al., 2004).  
 
The term nonmarket strategy is relatively young and was primarily coined by Baron (1995) 
referring to the fact that a firm has to establish a particular knowledge and competencies in 
order to address its nonmarket environment. These special skills build a nonmarket 
advantage that prevents the firm of competitors who themselves will find it costly to 
duplicate these nonmarket skills (Bonardi et al. 2005, Bonardi et al. 2006). Other authors 
refer to the ability of corporations to manage institutional idiosyncrasy (Hensiz, 2003), 
strategic political management (Oliver & Holzinger, 2008) or corporate political activities 
(Hillmann & Hitt, 1999).  
3. Explanations to strategic political management theories 
The fact that firms attempt to manage the political environment has been approached by 
various theories. Each theoretical perspective provides a very distinct viewpoint and 
contributes partial explanations of the how and why firms are strategically active in 
political management. Within this article, the focus lies on the fields of corporate political 
behavior (Baron, 1995; Bonardi et al., 2005; Getz, 1993, 1997; Hilmann & Hitt, 1999; 
Schaffer, 1995) and the resource-based view of the firm (Barney, 1991, 2001; Wernerfelt, 
1984; Oliver & Holzinger, 2008) as these approaches are the only ones who discuss the 
different capabilities among firms of managing their public environment.  
 
Other theoretical perspectives that encompass the fields of economics of political and 
collective action, public policy and stakeholder management mainly focus on the how 
and why firms engage in political management, but lack to explain why firms are more or 
less successful in doing so. The economic perspective of political and collective action 
analyzes the influence of firms on political decision-makers as well as their challenges, but 
does not explain why firms may gain a competitive advantage through their distinctive 
nonmarket strategy (Hersch & McDougall, 2000). The public policy perspective focuses 
on a broader context of the impact of a collective interest of businesses rather than on the 
individual level and thus does not provide insights why firms face advantages or 
disadvantages with specific nonmarket strategies (Shaffer, 1995; Useem, 1980). Eventually, 
the stakeholder management approach focuses primarily on the motivational aspect of 
firms engaged in political management (Hansen & Mitchell, 2000; Hart, 2001; Schuler, 
1999; Schuler et al., 2002) without analyzing the performance of nonmarket strategies. A 
further discussion of theses approaches is analyzed by Oliver & Holzinger (2008). 
 
The most advanced theoretical perspective of strategic political management is the 
approach of corporate political behavior. It principally explores the cause of interaction 
of firms in politics, which can be, for example, collective or private benefits (Olson, 1965), 
hindering unfavorable regulation (Yoffie, 1987), cost reduction (Kaufmann et al., 1993) or 
describing the feasible political strategies for firms (Hillmann & Hitt, 1999). The corporate 
political behavior approach distinguishes between two important factors that influence the 
motivation and conditions of the corporate political management, factors on industry and 
on firm level. Factors on industry level can be industry concentration (Schuler et al., 2002; 
Zardkoohi, 1985) or policy impact on industry (Epstein, 1969; Yoffie, 1987; Getz, 1993). 
On the other hand, firm level factors can be firm size (Epstein, 1980; Meznar & High, 
1995; Yoffie, 1987), material interest (Boies 1989) or issue salience (Schuler & Rehbein, 
1997).  
 
In the following, the corporate political behavior approach will be presented in more detail 
to point out how different nonmarket capabilities are considered in this perspective. The 
attempt of firms to influence its nonmarket environment can be presented as an exchange 
on a “political market” with interest groups on the demand-side and elected politicians on 
the supply-side. Politicians accept resources from the interest groups in exchange for 
policy demands. Resources are principally votes, financing or information (Mueller, 2003). 
This approach is thus different from early economics literature when politicians were 
assumed to only adopt policies that are in favor of the “public interest” (Buchanan & 
Tullock, 1962; Stigler, 1971). According to the political market approach firms are thus 
demanders that design nonmarket strategies in order to target political decision makers by 
providing the three resources: information, financing and constituency-building. Table 1 
describes the different strategies with their possible tactics for each resource (Hillmann & 
Hitt, 1999). 
 
 
Table 1: Taxonomy of Political Strategies (Hillmann & Hitt, 1999) 
Strategy Tactics Characteristics 
Information strategy • Lobbying 
• Commission research projects and 
reporting research results 
• Testifying as expert witness 
• Supplying position papers or technical 
reports 
Targets political decision 
makers by providing 
information 
 Financial incentive 
strategy 
 
• Contributions to politicians or party 
• Honoraria for speaking 
• Paid travel, etc. 
• Persons service (hiring people with 
political experience or having a firm 
member run for office) 
Targets political decision 
makers by providing financial 
incentives 
Constituency-building 
strategy 
• Grassroots mobilization of employees, 
suppliers, customers, etc. 
• Advocacy advertising 
• Public relations 
• Press conferences 
• Political education programs 
Targets political decision 
makers indirectly through 
constituent support 
Originally, the political market approach was limited to the homogenous consideration of 
the supply side, i.e., treating regulatory authorities analogue to politicians, which is 
obviously a severe limitation. Regulatory authorities have principally the task to adopt 
administrative regulations to implement public policies that were decreed by politicians. 
As regulatory authorities consist of experts who are not directly elected they are less 
interested in constituency-building than politicians. Furthermore, they are not allowed to 
accept financial incentives. Nonmarket strategies must be thus designed differently (Baron, 
2001) with a focus on information strategy. Bonardi et al. (2006) enlarged the political 
market approach by considering the particular role of regulatory authorities on the supply-
side  
 
The political market approach has still a limitation in explaining the heterogeneous ability 
of firms in their performance of nonmarket strategies. Bonardi et al. (2006) agrees that this 
ability can be drawn back to distinctive nonmarket capabilities without agreeing on the 
detailed description of these capabilities. They describe non-market capabilities as “tacit 
and non-tacit knowledge and skills” that help managing process and outcomes of public 
policies. In line with the political market approach they focus mainly on the ability to 
mitigate transaction cost in political markets. Transaction cost in political markets are high 
due to the imperfect distribution of information and subjective models (North, 1990) and 
are thus a relevant factor in specifying, monitoring, and enforcing political transactions 
(Dixit, 1996). Bonardi et al. (2006) argued that a firm’s experience in dealing with public 
policy-makers as well as its ability to learn from other firms’ interaction has a positive 
impact on its nonmarket performance. In consequence, these arguments explain partially 
how firms may adapt their behavior to take influence in a more efficient manner by means 
of external capabilities1, but it does not explain how firms constitute internal capabilities 
that target their own organization rather than the external environment.  
 
The resource-based view of the firm closes the gap of describing more detailed the 
specific nonmarket capabilities of firms that are the basic driver for the formulation of the 
appropriate nonmarket strategy and its performance.  According to the resource-based view, 
firms can achieve a sustained competitive advantage that is based on their controlled 
resources and capabilities, which are valuable, rare, imperfectly imitable and not 
                                              
1 External capabilities refer to the external environment of the firm as source of effectiveness (e.g., lobbying or 
constituency building). On the contrary, internal capabilities refer to the firm itself as source of effectiveness (e.g., 
adapting organizational architecture).  
substitutable (Barney, 1991, Barney, 2001, Conner, 1991). The competitive advantages 
eventually help firms to maintain and generate value by means of maintaining or gaining a 
competitive advantage (Annad & Khanna, 2000; Makadok, 2001; Priem & Butler, 2001). 
Barney (1991) describes the value as the economic rent by exploiting opportunities in the 
firm’s environment by means of their resources or resource combination. The aim of value 
creation and value maintenance has been adopted in literature as drivers of political 
strategic management (Baron, 1997; Hillmann & Hitt, 1999; Bonardi et al., 2005; Oliver & 
Holzinger, 2008).  
4.  Dynamic capabilities as source of effective nonmarket strategies 
 
Scholars of the resource-based view have highlighted the significance of dynamic 
capabilities as source of organizational performance (Thomas, 1996; Eisenhardt & Martin, 
2000; Blyler & Coff, 2003). Dynamic capabilities help to align resources and capabilities 
to the changing environment. Eisenhardt & Martin (2000) describe dynamic capabilities as 
“a set of specific and identifiable processes that, although idiosyncratic to firms in their 
details and path dependent in their emergence, have significant commonality in the form of 
best practices across firms, allowing them to generate new, value creating strategies” (in 
Arragón-Correa & Sharma, 2003). It is not sufficient for firms to possess resources, but 
they must be also able to maximize congruency with the demands of changing 
environments by developing, recombining, and deploying internal competencies 
(Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000; Bowman & Ambrosini, 2003). This process of adaptation to 
changes in the firms’ general business environment is done by means of dynamic 
capabilities. They can vary depending on the market dynamism (Cockburn et al. 2000; 
Rosenblom, 2000).  
 
Oliver & Holzinger (2008) conclude that dynamic capabilities serve not only to react to the 
changed requirements of the environment, but also to influence environmental demands so 
that these demands are aligned with strengths or requirements of the firm. As a 
consequence, dynamic capabilities are thus a source of value creation to obtain a 
competitive advantage also in the nonmarket environment. A firm’s political strategy is 
thus grounded in a specific capability to generate value. Oliver & Holzinger (2008) 
differentiate alternative political approaches along two axes: (1) Value perspective: value 
maintenance or value creation and (2) Strategic orientation: compliance or influence. The 
four alternative political strategies are laid down in Table 2 with a distinction between 
defensive, reactive, anticipatory or proactive. In the sequence of numeration, the defensive 
political strategy generates the lowest sustainable competitive advantage and the proactive 
political strategy the longest ranging sustainable competitive advantage.  
 
Table 2: Typology of Political Management Strategies (deduced from Oliver & Holzinger, 
2008) 
Type of Political Management Strategy  
Reactive political 
strategy 
Anticipatory   
political strategy 
Defensive  political 
strategy 
Proactive  political 
strategy 
Source of 
effectiveness 
Internal  Internal External External 
Dynamic Flexible Scanning and Political and social Institutional 
 
The main contribution from Oliver & Holzinger (2008) is the differentiation in sources of 
effectiveness for the nonmarket capabilities. Differentiation between internal and external 
sources is necessary to reflect if either the firm seeks to influence policy makers or to 
search for internal processes to better deal with its nonmarket environment. I agree that in 
both external and internal sources firms need own capabilities in order to be affective. For 
example, if a firm opts for lobbying through a lobbyist independent from the firm, it is still 
required that the firm possesses the capability of dealing with lobbyists. However, I 
criticize the simplified way of laying strategies behind the proposed dynamic capabilities. 
Oliver & Holzinger (2008) do not provide a sufficient argumentation for linking each 
dynamic capability to a particular political strategy. As an example, it is questionable why 
the internal capability of “flexible organizational architecture” is connected with a reactive 
political strategy. For the following, we adopt the dynamic capabilities proposed by Oliver 
& Holzinger (2008) without referring further to the different types of political strategy.  
 
 
5.  Contingent Resource-Based View    
 
The contingency theory is based on the argumentation that firms that are able to proper 
align endogenous organizational variables with exogenous business context variables will 
gain a greater organizational performance (Burns & Stalker, 1961; Thompson, 1967; 
Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967). Brush & Artz (1999) first evoked the term “contingent 
resource-based theory” in their analysis of professional medical services as they found the 
resource-based view insensitive to the firm’s context. They proposed to fill the gap by 
insights from the information asymmetry perspective so that resources and capabilities 
have a higher value if different firms are unevenly informed about the product market. 
Other supporters like Barney (2001) supported to the proposition to include the contingent 
argument into the resource-based view. This would allow a better assessment of the firms’ 
competitive value of their resources and capabilities. In line with this call, Aragón-Correa 
& Sharma (2003) argue that firms’ capabilities evolve from continuous innovation, 
organizational learning, stakeholder integration and a proactive environmental strategy. A 
proactive environmental strategy can help a firm to keep its resources valuable and 
inimitable by means of innovation (Aragón-Correa & Sharma, 2003). They propose a 
general theory that links the influence of external business characteristics (in their case 
capability organizational 
architecture 
predictive 
capabilities 
 
capital deployment influence 
capabilities 
Underlying 
process of 
effectiveness 
achieved 
Continual structural 
and process 
realignment to 
match political 
changes 
Timely and 
continuous scanning 
of political 
environment to 
anticipate changes 
Continuous 
cultivation of social 
ties to influence 
government to 
maintain current 
policies 
Influencing the 
norms and beliefs of 
stakeholders to 
shape how political 
standards are 
defined 
Value 
perspective 
Value maintenance Value creation Value maintenance Value creation 
Strategic 
orientation 
Compliance Compliance Influence Influence 
uncertainty, complexity and munificence) to the ability of a firm to develop a proactive 
environmental strategy and its competitive advantage. The article will only focus on the 
variable of uncertainty in the general business environment of the firm with a particular 
focus on perceived regulatory uncertainty. The concept will be introduced in the next 
section. 
6.  Concept of perceived regulatory uncertainty  
Thompson (1967:13) stated that “the central problem for complex organizations is one of 
coping with uncertainty”. The impact of uncertainty on business decisions and corporate 
performance has been a key concept in organizational research since many years. Scholars 
analyzed firms’ reactions and adaptations to uncertainty (e.g., Miles & Snow, 1978, 
Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967) and developed scales to measure the impact of uncertainty on 
organizations (Duncan 1972, Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967). Furthermore, a differentiation 
has been introduced between objective and perceptual types of uncertainty (Milliken, 1987, 
Lang, 1990, Aragón-Correa & Sharma, 2003). 
 
Basically, uncertainty in strategic management organization theories refers to the 
unpredictability of environmental or organizational variables (Miles & Snow, 1978, Pfeffer 
& Salancik, 1972) or the inadequate information about these variables (Duncan, 1972, 
Galbraith, 1977). If uncertainty increases the predictability of corporate performance 
decreases. As a consequence, the firm’s business risk will be increased. Uncertainty can 
result from different causes, which can be originating from exogenous shocks, 
unforeseeable behavioral choices or the two causes combined (Lessard, 1988). 
 
In order to measure the intensity or degree of uncertainty, Courtney et al. (1997) developed 
a differentiation of four levels of uncertainty and show up appropriate analytical tools for 
decision-makers to deal with the respective uncertainty (cf. Graphic 1). The first level of 
uncertainty is described as “clear-enough future” where a single forecast is sufficient to 
determine a firm’s strategy. At the second level, the “alternate futures”, a strategy must 
be developed according to the different discrete outcomes that define the future. The third 
level of uncertainty, described as “range of futures”, does not allow any more the creation 
of scenarios, and a large range of possible outcomes must be taken into account to 
determine the future. Finally, the fourth level is characterized by “true ambiguity” which 
is the case when no basis for forecasts exist.  
Graphic 1: Four distinct levels of uncertainty (Courtney et al, 1997) 
 
Finally, a critical component while thinking of an investment is its timing as uncertainty 
evolves over time. In this sense, Doh & Pearce (2004) distinguish between continuous and 
discontinuous uncertainty. Continuous uncertainty refers to a relative stable environment 
with slow and steady changes whereas discontinuous uncertainty is characterized by 
uneven changes. 
 
We refer to the term “regulatory uncertainty” to appropriately address the inability of a 
company’s decision-maker to have a clear understanding of future regulations that will 
evolve in its organizational environment (Birnbaum, 1984). Regulation in our context 
describes a specific form of government action including supervision and market control 
over actors and their behavior (Eberlein & Grande, 2005). We see regulatory uncertainty as 
discontinuous uncertainty to reflect the non-continuous, uneven changes in regulation over 
time. Typically, a single regulatory decision can change the business environment of a firm 
abruptly. As firms are obliged to respect the regulatory decisions, we refer to the regulatory 
environment as a way of exercising coercive power of regulatory agencies on organization 
(Scott, 2001).  
 
According to Courtney’s uncertainty classification, regulatory uncertainty is primarily 
based on the second and third level of uncertainty. For example, a regulatory authority 
announces that a threshold for pollution of a pollutant will be introduced, but the precise 
level of the threshold will be announced at a later date (level 2 uncertainty). Therefore, the 
firm is only uncertain about the threshold and faces alternate futures, e.g., scenarios with 
low, middle or high thresholds. In the second example, the regulatory authority is not yet 
sure about the choice between an introduction of a simple threshold or of a more 
sophisticated system like the emission trading scheme in the EU (level 3 uncertainty). In 
this case, the firm faces a range of futures and has a higher difficulty to prepare his 
business. 
We anchor perceived regulatory uncertainty in institutional theory as a sub-concept of 
perceived environmental uncertainty. The focus on the perception of uncertainty is 
especially important in this concept because the perceived influence of regulation on a firm 
may be different from objective uncertainty (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996). 
A key element to work with the term regulatory uncertainty is the distinction of different 
types of perceived environmental uncertainties according to Milliken (1987) that helps to 
better reflect the “point of impact” of uncertainty on the organization. Milliken 
differentiates between three types of environmental uncertainty: state uncertainty, effect 
uncertainty, and response uncertainty:  
• State uncertainty is related to the inability of the organization to predict its future 
organizational environment or a particular component of the environment.  
• Effect uncertainty is defined as an “inability to predict what the nature of the 
impact of a future state of the environment or environmental change will be on the 
organization” (Milliken, 1987:137). 
• Response uncertainty is characterized by the understanding of the environment 
and its causes, but a lack of knowledge of response options available for the 
organization. 
For this article, we focus on state uncertainty where the firm is not able to predict the 
future state of regulations or policies that affect its business environment. Generally, firms 
can respond to regulatory uncertainty with different response strategies, each can contain 
market and nonmarket components. 
7. Nonmarket capabilities and response strategies to regulatory uncertainty 
In general, a variety of strategic responses to uncertainty are possible for organizations (cf., 
e.g., Miller, 1992). If the consideration is limited to regulatory uncertainty four generic 
strategic responses differentiated: reduction, adaptation, avoidance, and disregard 
(Engau & Hoffmann, 2009). To analyze the effectiveness of the nonmarket capabilities, the 
detailed consideration of response types should be limited to uncertainty reduction and 
adaptation to uncertainty as they appear to be the most frequent reactions.  
In the case of reduction, uncertainty can be limited by influencing, simplification, and 
investigation. One possibility of influencing is lobbying of political institutions, which can 
be done by influencing specific conditions or directly addressing political actors (Courtney 
et al., 1997, Little & Li 1995, Henisz & Delios, 2004). A further way may be simplification 
of the uncertain factors (Bourgois & Eisenhard, 1988) or investigation by collecting 
additional information and building on professional expertise in the decision-making 
processes (Miller & Friesen, 1983, Hickson et al., 1971).  
A second way of dealing with regulatory uncertainty can be adaptation. Organizations can 
adjust their organizational design via mergers, acquisitions and divestures (Thompson, 
1967, Cyert & March, 1963, Bergh & Lawless, 1998). Firms can also adapt by increasing 
the flexibility in their investment portfolio (Wernerfelt & Karnani, 1987, Bourgeois & 
Eisenhardt, 1987, Collis, 1992) or by cooperating with other companies that are similarly 
or less exposed to regulatory uncertainty (Thompson, 1967, Carter, 1990). Furthermore, 
firms may copy or imitate the strategies of peers in order to minimize the effect of relative 
competitive disadvantages (Anderson & Paine, 1975, Bourgeois & Eisenhard, 1987). 
Though resource-based view covers only the resources and capabilities of the firm, I draw 
on contingency theory, which states that organizational performance is a result of 
alignment between the exogenous context variables (such as uncertainty) and the 
endogenous organizational design variables. As shown above, Oliver & Holzinger (2008) 
assume that corporate political strategies that target value creation are based on the 
dynamic capabilities of scanning and predictive capabilities and institutional influence 
capabilities. As both lobbying as well as investigation efforts lead to the reduction of 
regulatory uncertainty I hypothesize that the underlying capabilities also reduce perceived 
regulatory uncertainty. The assumption is that firms with stronger nonmarket capabilities 
perceive lower regulatory uncertainty than firms with weaker nonmarket capabilities. A 
consequence would be that firms that perceive high regulatory uncertainty tend to establish 
capabilities that lead to a reduced perceived regulatory uncertainty. According to terms of 
Oliver & Holzinger (2008), these firms would thus tend to follow a value creation strategy.  
This argumentation is in line with Aragón-Correa & Sharma (2003) who argue that 
perceived state uncertainty, according to Milliken’s uncertainty classification, positively 
influences the link between a proactive environmental strategy and competitive advantage. 
Therefore, regulatory uncertainty would initiate firms to develop a proactive environmental 
strategy, which helps reaching a good performance. Environmental uncertainty thus 
increases the probability that a company invests proactively.  
 
Proposition 1a: Firms that perceive high regulatory uncertainty tend to establish scanning 
and predictive and/or institutional influence capabilities 
Proposition 1b: Scanning and predictive capabilities tend to reduce perceived regulatory 
uncertainty 
Proposition 1c: Institutional influence capabilities tend to reduce perceived regulatory 
uncertainty  
 
Firms that perceive a lower regulatory uncertainty would then rather follow in consequence 
a value maintenance political strategy, i.e., a less proactive environmental strategy. 
According to Oliver & Holzinger (2008), the dynamic capabilities would be based on 
flexible organizational architecture capabilities and political social capital deployment 
capabilities.   
 
Proposition 2a: Firms that perceive low regulatory uncertainty tend to formulate a value 
maintenance nonmarket strateg 
Proposition 2b: Flexible organizational architecture capabilities help firms to adapt to 
regulatory uncertainty  
Proposition 2c: Political social capital deployment capabilities help firms to adapt to 
regulatory uncertainty  
8. Nonmarket capabilities and investments under regulatory uncertainty 
The argumentation in literature for the impact of regulatory uncertainty on investment 
decisions is basically twofold. One group of scholars sees regulatory uncertainty as 
negative impact on investment decisions and states that regulatory uncertainty gives an 
additional cost from a transaction cost perspective, which thrive organizations to wait or 
postpone projects until further information or clarity is gathered (e.g., Luo, 2004).  
 
The opposing group of scholars argues that regulatory uncertainty even triggers 
investments as firms can gain a competitive advantage. The rational is based on either the 
resourced-based view of the firm or the real-option approach. According to the resource-
based view, investment under regulatory uncertainty can secure the firm specific valuable 
resources that can be leveraged for the firm’s performance (e.g., Rugman & Verbeke, 
1998). Alternatively, according to the real option approach, firms can benefit from 
investments under regulatory uncertainty by gaining a right for a future, larger investment, 
which then will generate large payoffs. The option has thus no enforced obligation to 
actually do the investment in the future (e.g., Doh & Pearce, 2004). The value of the option 
is thus driven by the development of the underlying uncertainty, in our case, regulatory 
decisions or developments.  
 
The question is now whether the before mentioned nonmarket capabilities enable firms to 
better cope with perceived regulatory uncertainty. Staying in line with the contingency 
argument and the aforementioned propositions that a value creation nonmarket strategy 
would reduce perceived regulatory uncertainty firms with stronger nonmarket capabilities 
would therefore tend to invest than firms with weaker nonmarket capabilities. This 
investment behavior would also hold true for firms with a value creation nonmarket 
strategy in comparison to those with a value maintenance strategy. Finally, the most likely 
to withhold investments under perceived regulatory uncertainty are firms with very weak 
nonmarket capabilities.  
 
Proposition 3a: Firm with stronger nonmarket capabilities have a higher tendency to 
invest under perceived regulatory uncertainty than firms with weaker nonmarket 
capabilities 
Proposition 3b: Firms with a value creation nonmarket strategy have a higher tendency to 
invest also under perceived regulatory uncertainty rather than those with a value 
maintenance strategy 
Proposition 3c: Firms are more likely to withhold investments under perceived regulatory 
uncertainty if they have very weak nonmarket capabilities 
 
Doh & Pearce (2004) analyzed firms in an uncertain regulatory environment and how they 
can best respond via entrepreneurial strategies. By means of the real option theory they 
recommend firms to adjust their investments along the degree and slope of regulatory 
uncertainty (degree of uncertainty adapted from Courtney et al., 1997). According to the 
degree of uncertainty, four different generic strategies are proposed: preemptive, optioned, 
synchronous, and adaptive strategies. Preemptive strategies are best at low regulatory 
uncertainty and are characterized by firms doing a “first strike” with a high resource 
commitment. Option strategies are best at low to moderate regulatory uncertainty where 
firms do initial investment, which keeps the right to do a further investment step at a later 
stage. Synchronous strategies are best at moderate to high regulatory uncertainty to 
synchronize investments to the progress of policy change. Finally, adaptive strategies are 
best at highly uncertain environments where investments are made as a response to policy 
change. The latter is thus a purely reactive strategy without risking even initial investments 
under uncertainty. 
Proposition 4a: Firms with strong internal nonmarket capabilities rather invest with 
option-based strategies 
Proposition 4b: Firms with strong external nonmarket capabilities rather invest with 
synchronous strategies 
9.  Discussion and further research 
The article advances the theoretical discussion about the effectiveness of corporate 
political strategies in the way that it considers the sensitivity of the organizational variables 
to the external business variables of the general environment of the firm. I refer to the 
contingency argument, first introduced in organizational theories as early as in the 1960s, 
that was only linked to the resource-based view in the last ten years. It basically explains 
that organizational performance is depending on the degree of alignment between the 
exogenous context variables and the endogenous organizational design variables. 
Uncertainty is thereby one of the key variables of the external business environment of the 
firm. In order to make it applicable for the nonmarket environment of the firm, I refer to 
perceived regulatory uncertainty that requires an alignment by the firm by means of its 
nonmarket capabilities.  
 
The propositions made in the article considers these theoretical deductions and would 
allow an empirical testing. Generally, propositions in literature to describe and classify 
nonmarket capabilities are so far mainly theoretical. Bonardi et al. (2006) provide a rare 
example of empirical testing, but they limit their view on external nonmarket capabilities. 
It would be therefore necessary to provide empirical insights of a further classification. I 
propose an empirical testing within the Swiss power generation market where, in a first 
step, a round of interviews should be conducted. The power generation market in general is 
– as mentioned in the introduction – obviously a suitable example of an industry where 
sector and technological regulation influence the investment decisions. Market 
liberalization limits the ability of generation firms to shift the risk associated to power 
investments to their customers. Therefore, perceived regulatory uncertainty is one of the 
main threats in their business environment. It is in the firms’ interest to follow a value 
creation nonmarket strategy that finally targets to reduce regulatory uncertainty.  
 
So far, this paper principally serves as discussion basis to formulate hypotheses on the 
linkage of nonmarket capabilities and perceived regulatory uncertainty. I’m grateful of any 
comments to the paper and propositions to consider further theoretical or empirical aspects.  
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